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Abstract
Whether international humanitarian norms are respected during and after civil
conflict depends on the behavior of both governments and non-state actors (NSAs).
However, international conventions on the protection of civilians generally do not
address NSAs, as such conventions are open only to the representatives of states.
In a pioneering initiative, the non-governmental organization Geneva Call has
started to address this problem by soliciting NSAs to sign ‘deeds of commit-
ment’ to ban particular activities violating humanitarian norms. Focusing on the
case of anti-personnel mines, we examine why non-state actors would choose to
sign conventions that limit their autonomy, and whether such conventions can
change the behavior of governments and non-state armed groups. We propose
a game-theoretic model of how the interaction between governments and NSAs
shape their incentives to commit to and comply with international humanitarian
norms. Our empirical evidence highlights the importance of these interdepencies
between governments and NSAs in the realm of humanitarian engagements.
word count: approx. 11000
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Introduction
Civil wars have been the deadliest type of armed conflict since 1945 and often see
pervasive human rights violations. Evidence of deliberate violence against civilians,
forced recruitment and child soldiering, inhumane treatment of prisoners, and use of
banned weapons abound in human rights reports, legal proceedings, and scholarship on
civil wars. Yet, international humanitarian norms intended to protect noncombatants
in armed conflicts have only limited reach in civil wars. International humanitarian
law is generally not geared towards armed non-state actors, but almost exclusively
focused on the representatives of states. Whereas governments are legally bound by
their international humanitarian commitments, armed non-state actors1 (NSAs) are
typically precluded from signing the relevant conventions.2
This discrepancy has not escaped the attention of the international community. The
non-governmental organization (NGO) Geneva Call tries to fill this void by soliciting
NSAs to sign specific conventions in which they commit to banning particular ac-
tivities and consent to monitoring for compliance. The first convention offered is a
deed of commitment banning the use of landmines, intended to parallel the interstate
Ottowa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (e.g., Moser-Puangsuwan, 2008).3
Landmines are used extensively in contemporary civil wars such as the conflicts in
Syria and Myanmar. The 2015 Landmine Monitor Report records a global total of
3,678 direct fatalities caused by mines for 2014 alone (p. 1).4 In addition to the
immediate harm inflicted (much of which remains unrecorded), unremoved landmines
threaten to kill or maim people for many years even after armed hostilities have ceased.
Several NSAs have responded to Geneva Call’s initiative since its launch in 2000
and signed agreements limiting their use of landmines in much the same way as gov-
ernments under the Ottawa convention. However, even a cursory look at contemporary
1By non-state actors (NSAs) we refer to actors currently or previously — engaged in armed conflict,
in line with the terminology of Geneva Call (2007). Studies of human rights stressing non-state
mobilization — e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) — often use the term much more broadly, including
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
2Note, however, that some authors argue that NSAs are still legally bound by such conventions (see
Clapham, 2006).
3Geneva Call has meanwhile expanded to other areas, such as child soldiering and sexual violence.
4More specifically, this includes victims from landmines, victim-activated improvised explosive
devices, cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war, see http://www.
the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/landmine-monitor-2015.aspx.
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conflict and post-conflict countries reveals considerable variation in whether govern-
ments and non-state actors actually commit to these agreements. In his 2010 inaugural
address, Colombian President Santos implored the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC) to cease using landmines.5 Geneva Call had since 2006 unsuc-
cessfully attempted to get FARC to sign the deed of commitment on anti-personnel
mines (Geneva Call, 2006), despite the Colombian government having joined the
Ottawa landmine treaty in 2000. Geneva Call’s activities were more successful in
Sudan. In October 2001 the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
signed the proposed convention (Geneva Call, 2007), and the Sudanese government
followed suit two years later in signing up to the Ottawa treaty. By the end of 2014,
162 state parties had signed the Ottawa mine ban treaty, and 50 non-state actors from
10 countries had done the same for Geneva Call’s deed of commitment.6 While some
non-state actors have formally committed to the convention after their government
signed the treaty, others have signed before the government pledged its support.
These actions by governments, non-state actors, and the NGO Geneva Call high-
light an important dynamic currently neglected in the literature on humanitarian law in
civil wars. Signing decisions by governments as well as their compliance with treaty
obligations are typically studied without taking into account domestic non-state armed
groups. Likewise, the behavior of NSAs is considered in isolation, neglecting the
opportunities offered by NGOs like Geneva Call and the influence of governments.
Taking these overlooked dynamics into account, in this article we address two
questions: First, why would state and non-state actors sign a constraining convention
that limits their tactical repertoire? Second, what effects do such conventions have
on the subsequent behavior of the signing parties? We offer an explanation that high-
lights the interdependence between NSAs and governments and the role of reputation
effects relative to costs of forsaking a specific military technology. Our analysis
extends current research on treaties in international relations to non-state actors and
to the context of civil wars and their aftermath. We posit that the ongoing debate on
the screening and constraining effects of international agreements is relevant beyond
states and formal treaties (e.g., Simmons, 1998, 2010; Simmons and Hopkins 2005;
von Stein 2005), and that analogous mechanisms can apply to NSAs and informal
5“Santos assumes Colombia’s presidency amid conciliation with Venezuela, Ecuador” Los Angeles
Times August 10, 2010.
6http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties,
http://www.genevacall.org/.
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agreements or commitment devices as well (see Bangerter, 2011; Jo and Thomson,
2014; Jo, 2015).
Indeed, although Geneva Call’s efforts to engage non-state armed groups are quite
specific and limited, the data on convention signing and compliance allow us to gain
insights that extend beyond this particular application. Our analyses show how deci-
sions by governments and non-state actors are mutually dependent. The decision of an
NSAs to ratify Geneva Call’s deed of commitment can influence the reputation costs
of governments for not signing, and hence induce governments to sign the Ottawa con-
vention in situations where they would not otherwise do so. Similar relationships are
likely to be found in other areas where no NGO offers formal deeds of commitments
to NSAs, but where NGOs try to influence governments and NSAs through “naming
and shaming” (e.g., Hafner-Burton, 2008). Moreover, we find that selection effects are
important for evaluating the impact of the Ottawa convention and Geneva Call’s deed
of commitment on subsequent conflict behavior. Although a naive analysis suggests
that countries signing the Ottowa convention are more likely to refrain from using
landmines, this effect disappears once we take the signing decisions by NSAs into
account (in line with more critical assessments, e.g., Drezner, 2005). Accounting for
these selection effects is also crucial when it comes to the behavior of NSAs, for which
our findings point to the opposite: We find a restraining effect of Geneva Call’s deed
of commitment for NSAs, but only after accounting for the endogenous nature of their
decision to formally endorse this convention.
Human rights and non-state actors
While humanitarian law originally developed to constrain the behavior of governments
in international conflicts, scholars and experts of law started considering ways to
legally constrain NSAs in the 1970s (Clapham, 2006; Barbelet, 2008, 82f), as both
states and NSAs perpetrate human rights violations in intrastate wars. Human rights
obligations for NSAs are still less clearly developed than for states, as NSAs are
not signatories to standard international conventions.7 Not surprisingly, the literature
on compliance with international law remains largely state-centric (Simmons, 2010),
and only recently have scholars become interested in whether other agents such as
individuals or NSAs comply with international law, treaties, or less formal obligations
7See Clapham (2006) on the debates surrounding the application of international humanitarian law
and human rights to NSAs.
4
such as norms or conventions (Bangerter, 2011; Jo and Thomson, 2014; Jo, 2015;
Morrow, 2007, 2014).8
There has been some interest in compliance with the laws of war (Valentino, Huth
and Croco, 2006; Morrow, 2007, 2014), as well as wartime civilian targeting (Valentino,
Huth and Balch-Lindsay, 2004; Eck and Hultman, 2007; Downes, 2011) and child sol-
diering (Beber and Blattman, 2013; Lasley and Thyne, 2015). Bussmann and Schnei-
der (2015), for example, analyze how the ratification of international humanitarian law
influences access by the International Committee of the Red Cross in civil wars and
violence against civilians. Closest to our focus and approach, Jo and Thomson (2014)
assess compliance with humanitarian access in armed conflicts and its relationship to
reputation and international organizations (see also Stanton, 2009; Bangerter, 2011;
Jo, 2015).
All these studies, however, consider violations of humanitarian laws in isolation
from the interactions among opponents in civil conflicts. The recent literature on
human rights treaties and compliance is more attuned to the interaction between actors:
Researchers drawing on a sociological institutionalist perspective see the increasing
ratification of human rights treaties as evidence of the growing strength of human right
norms (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). However,
other scholars reach more pessimistic conclusions, suggesting that governments often
sign human rights conventions without actually enforcing them (e.g., Hafner-Burton,
2008; Hathaway, 2002; Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011; Simmons, 2009; Vreeland,
2008). Skeptics thus question whether the proliferation of treaties actually entails more
than lip-service to norms, and whether signing treaties by itself changes behavior.
The debate about the effects of human rights treaties is part of a more general
controversy about the problems in assessing the effects of treaties, since signing a
treaty is often influenced by the intended or expected compliance (e.g., Simmons,
1998; Simmons and Hopkins, 2005; von Stein, 2005; Simmons, 2010). That signa-
tories of treaties behave differently may simply reflect the fact that parties sign treaties
they are already (or more likely to be) compliant with rather than the effects of treaties
themselves. Similar issues are at stake when it comes to the Ottowa convention and
the Geneva Call deed of commitment. Some scholars have questioned the importance
of the Ottawa treaty, as most signatories did not stock landmines at ratification and the
8In the context of the Ottowa convention some researchers emphasize the importance of NGOs and
civil society to bring about this mine ban treaty (Price, 1998; Rutherford, 2000), but this body of research
has paid less attention to how conventions affect non-state actors in conflict.
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enforcement mechanisms remain weak (e.g., Drezner, 2005). Similarly, the SPLM/A
in Sudan had already stopped using landmines when it signed Geneva Call’s deed of
commitment.9 In short, to assess the causal nature of such conventions, we need to
establish plausible counterfactuals for behavior in the absence of the treaty.
The initiative of the NGO Geneva Call provides a unique opportunity to assess
the interactions between governments and non-state actors and their influence on each
other, as it is the most extensive effort to propose human rights conventions to NSAs
to date. Geneva Call was founded in 1998, immediately after the Ottawa convention,
in response to the concern that the convention did not prevent armed NSAs from
continuing using mines. Geneva Call engages NSAs on landmines through the “Deed
of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Co-
operation in Mine Action,” which bans the production, use, and transfer of landmines,
and calls for participating in mine clearance and mine risk education. The convention
entails verification missions by Geneva Call. Geneva Call is currently engaged in six
regions, namely Africa (since 2000), Asia (since 2000), the Caucasus (since 2006),
Europe (since 2001), the Middle East (since 2000), and Latin America (since 2003).10
Table 1 summarizes the number of countries and NSAs that have signed the Ottowa
treaty and the Geneva Call convention up to the final year in our data, 2009. If states
and NSAs in conflict signed independently, we should see no systematic pattern to
when they sign. Likewise, if NSAs simply mimic states, we should only see them
sign in cases where governments have already signed, as the Ottawa convention has
been open longer. Table 1 indicates that more states have signed the Ottowa treaty
than NSAs signing Geneva Call’s deed of commitment. Of course, many states have
not been affected by armed conflict, and Geneva Call has so far only been active in a
limited number of war-torn countries.11 However, we also have a substantial number
of cases where NSAs sign before states do, or where states have not signed despite
NSAs signing.
9Personal communication by Pascal Bongard, program officer Geneva Call, January 5, 2011.
10See http://www.genevacall.org/where-we-work/ (accessed September 21, 2015).
11Our empirical analysis focuses only on countries where Geneva Call has been active. The fact that
Geneva Call tends to focus on NSAs with mine use in these countries implies a selection of hard cases,
where actors are more likely to have military advantages from mines and less likely to be compliant at
the outset.
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Table 1: Ratification of Landmine Ban Convention and Sequence
Countries number of NSAs that have signed
Country signed first, NSA afterwards Burundi 1
Phillipines 3
Turkey 1
NSA signed first, country afterwards Iraq 2
Sudan 1
NSA signed first, country not yet Burma 6
India 3
Iran 6
Morocco 1
Somalia 17
Country signed, no NSA signed 148 countries (77 with internal conflict, 54 since 1997)
Neither country nor NSA signed 34 countries (21 with internal conflict, 13 since 1997)
Sources: http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties
Geneva Call (2007)
A Model
We propose a simple game-theoretic model with incomplete and imperfect information
to understand why governments and armed non-state actors would ratify a convention
banning the use of landmines—the Ottawa and Geneva Call conventions, respectively—
and when ratification will subsequently be adhered to in practice. Formal ratification
is not necessarily followed by compliance, especially since such a constraint can un-
dermine an actor’s ability to achieve its objectives in the dispute against its opponent.
Governments and non-state actors in conflict pursue opposing objectives, which makes
their interaction strategic. This induces incentives to misrepresent. Thus, although
prior beliefs about compliance exist, both parties are uncertain whether the other party
will actually put commitments into action.
Sequence of Play
The game is played between a government G and an armed non-state actor A in
an ongoing or unresolved conflict. Accounting for the possibility that signing12 can
be a bluff (“cheap talk”) for some actors who will deliberately not comply despite
formal ratification, we assume that both actors G and A can be of type “nice” or
“mean” (explained in detail below), but their respective types remain private infor-
mation throughout the game. The extensive form of the game is given in Figure 1:
1. Nature (N ) determines G’s and A’s type (i.e., whether it is in G’s and A’s
interest to comply and refrain from using landmines if they choose to ratify their
12For NSAs there is no formal ratification process for conventions, and we use the terms signing and
ratification interchangeably here.
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respective conventions). For simplicity, this move is omitted from Figure 1.
2. The government G chooses whether (or not) to sign the Ottawa convention.
3. The armed non-state actor A decides whether (or not) to sign the Geneva Call
convention.
4. If only A has signed, but not G, then G gets another chance to sign or not sign
the Ottawa convention.
5. If A and/or G have ratified the convention, they decide simultaneously whether
to comply by refraining from using landmines.
This sequence of play mirrors the historical fact that the Ottawa convention pre-
ceded Geneva Call’s activities. We model compliance as a simultaneous move for
several reasons. First, unlike the historical trajectory in which the Ottawa convention
predates Geneva Call’s deed of commitment, there is no obvious first-mover for com-
pliance. Given the operational mode of landmines, it is difficult for both actors and
analyst to precisely date their installation. Second, we only have annual data on mine
use, and there is currently no information available to model more detailed sequencing.
Finally, compliance is an ongoing and multi-dimensional process that also involves
the removal of mines (which is admittedly a strong point of Geneva Call’s deed of
commitment and a weak point of the Ottowa convention).
Payoff Structure
The full payoffs for the two actors are given in Table 2 and are composed of the
following four elements. First, to capture the widely accepted notion that conflict
is generally costly (e.g. Fearon, 1995), we highlight the costs of conflict cwi > 0,
with i ∈ {G,A}. Second, we focus on the reputation of the government. We assume
that the public perception of ratification (not compliance) results in three levels of
reputation costs (or benefits) linked to three possible sequences of actions, namely
G signing the convention first, G refraining from signing, and G signing after A has
done so. Without loss of generality we scale these costs (and benefits) such that the
intermediary level is assumed to be zero, while the highest corresponds to a benefit and
the lowest to a cost. More precisely, we assume reputation benefits rG ≥ 0 (if G signs
8
Figure 1: Extensive Form of the Model
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Table 2: Actions and payoffs
Actions Payoffs
G A G A
sign, comply sign, comply −cwG − wG + wA + rG −cwA − wA + wG
sign, comply sign, not comply −cwG − wG + rG −cwA + wG − cA
sign, not comply sign, comply −cwG + wA + rG − cG −cwA − wA
sign, not comply sign, not comply −cwG + rG − cG −cwA − cA
sign, comply not sign −cwG − wG + rG −cwA + wG
sign, not comply not sign −cwG − cG + rG −cwA
not sign, sign, comply sign, comply −cwG − wG + wA −cwA − wA + wG
not sign, sign, comply sign, not comply −cwG − wG −cwA − cA + wG
not sign, sign, not comply sign, comply −cwG − cG + wA −cwA − wA
not sign, sign, not comply sign, not comply −cwG − cG −cwA − cA
not sign, not sign sign, comply −cwG − 2× rG + wA −cwA − wA
not sign, not sign sign, not comply −cwG − 2× rG −cwA − cA
not sign not sign −cwG −cwA
first), rG = 0 (if G signs after A), or costs (−2× rG ≤ 0 if A signs and G does not).13
This acknowledges an expectation for governments to ratify human rights treaties,
thereby signaling genuine commitment to respect international humanitarian norms
to domestic and international audiences. Armed NSAs, however, face no comparable
expectation to sign human rights conventions, precisely because such conventions have
been introduced only very recently, and cover merely a limited number of issues. We
hence assume that NSAs do not face reputation costs related to the signing of human
rights conventions.14
We also model the military costs and benefits, as banning landmines can potentially
alter the battlefield capabilities of both actors. Compliance will limit the available
military strategies, although the specific impact will depend on the advantages of
using mines and differ considerably across conflicts. Thus, we consider the observable
military disadvantage, or the increased costs of warfare wi ≥ 0 if a treaty is adhered
to, with i ∈ {G,A} (by assumed symmetry, these increased costs generate benefits for
the adversary).
The model also considers the potential consequences of non-compliance if a treaty
is formally ratified but not adhered to. Such costs will be substantial where actors
seek legitimacy, either from domestic or international audiences (Jo, 2015). Similar to
the signatory-related reputation costs outlined above, these costs also affect reputation,
13Thus, the costs of not signing the treaty after A’s signing of the convention is assumed to be twice
as large as the benefits of signing first. It is easy to see that if costs and benefits were of the same
magnitude, G will always sign at the first decision node if it were also to sign at its second node.
14Note that this assumption does not imply that NSAs do not face reputation costs related to human
rights violations; NSAs do indeed face such costs, albeit to varying degrees (see Stanton, 2009; Lasley
and Thyne, 2015; Jo, 2015).
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albeit for reasons related to non-compliance.15 We denote the increased costs related
to non-compliance by ci ≥ 0, with i ∈ {G,A}. While this component can be
monitored and anticipated, we assume that non-compliance is not fully observable
ex ante. Specifically, non-compliance by actor i removes the wi term from both actors’
payoffs, while the “offending” actor i pays a cost ci if non-compliance is detected
(possibly stochastically) by monitoring.
Finally, we use the conditions under which G and A will comply after having
signed their respective engagements as elements to generate prior beliefs over the two
types (i.e., “nice” or “mean”) these two actors may be. Jo and Thomson (2014, 327) ar-
gue that “humanitarian compliance involves a tradeoff between military considerations
and a motivation to comply.” Following this logic, we use the relationship between wi
and ci to characterize the actors’ types as either compliant after signatory (“nice”) or
non-compliant after signatory (“mean”). For the “nice” type we assume that ci = wi2 ,
while for the “mean” type ci = 2× wi. This implies that a “nice” type will always be
better off complying with a treaty or convention after signing, while the reverse is true
for the “mean” type (cf. Jo and Thomson, 2014). Intuitively, this captures the central
idea that for both actors compliance depends (in part) on the consequences of getting
caught relative to the purely military costs. As we assume thatG andA do not know the
type of their adversary, the signing decision and the ensuing compliance will depend on
their updated beliefs about each other. We denote the prior beliefs that the government
and armed non-state actor, respectively, are of type “nice” as p = Pr(cG = wG2 ) and
q = Pr(cA =
wA
2
); conversely, 1 − p = Pr(cG = 2wG) and 1 − q = Pr(cA = 2wA)
denote the belief that the other party is “mean”.
Equilibrium Analysis
Given incomplete and imperfect information, we use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) as our solution concept.16 Using the values for ci assumed for the “nice” and
the “mean” types it can be easily seen that a “nice” type, when faced by a compliance
decision, will always choose to comply, while the “mean” type in the same situation
15Note that in contrast to the reputation costs related to signing, we assume the costs for non-
compliance to apply to NSAs as well. Both the Ottawa treaty as well as Geneva Call’s deed of
commitment foresee measures to make non-compliance publicly visible.
16In the appendix we also solve the game under the assumption of complete information to develop
our intuitions.
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will never do so.17 Using our simple characterization of “nice” and “mean” types, we
solve the game using PBE and state the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies are:
separating =
{
mean G signs, nice G ¬ signs, A ¬ signs if wA
2
> wG > rG >
wG
2
if 2wG > wA, wG > rG >
wG
2
, wA
2wG
> p
pooling =

G ¬ signs, A signs, G signs if 2rG > wG, wG > wA, p > wAwG , wA > rG, q >
rG
wA
G ¬signs, A ¬ signs if wG > 2rG
G signs, A ¬ signs else
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that in pure strategies only a limited set of outcomes is pos-
sible. Several implications are worth highlighting here and inform our subsequent
empirical evaluation:
1. If the government’s costs of giving up landmines wG exceed reputation benefits
of signing rG and the prior belief p that G is mean is low, only a “mean”(or
noncompliant) G will sign, followed by both types of A not signing.
2. If the prior belief q thatA is “mean” is high, then both types ofGwill first refrain
from signing, but will follow suit after A has signed, provided that the military
costs wA are not too high.
3. If the military disadvantage wG is sufficiently high compared to G’s reputation
benefits rG, neither G nor A will ever sign.
4. If the prior belief q that A is “mean” is low, then both types of G will sign
immediately.
Observable implications
We now translate the theoretical implications of our formal model into empirically
testable hypotheses. Implications 1 and 3 suggest that higher reputation gains com-
pared to the costs of relinquishing landmines for the government increase the likeli-
hood for both actors G and A to sign their respective conventions:
Hypothesis 1. Governments are more likely to sign a convention if the associated
reputation gains outweigh the government’s military disadvantage associated with
compliance.
17This follows from the systematic comparisons of the four cases listed above.
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Hypothesis 2. NSAs are more likely to sign a convention if the government’s reputa-
tion gains associated with signing outweigh the government’s military disadvantage
associated with compliance.
We assume that governments’ domestic reputation costs are higher in democratic
countries, and that the costs of refraining from employing landmines can be proxied by
prior landmine use. The relationship between regime type and reputation costs with
regards to human rights treaties may not always be straightforward (e.g., Hathaway,
2007). Still, we see regime type as good proxy for sensitivity to reputation costs here,
since governments will care more about reputation costs when citizens have both the
incentives and capacity to make their voices heard.18 We assume that anti-personnel
mines are a subject of particular concern for domestic constituencies, as landmines
pose a long-lasting danger to civilians even after armed conflicts end, and that the ma-
jority of citizens will not support the use of anti-personnel mines in domestic conflicts
even if they have no sympathy for the rebels. Moreover, we assume that democratic
governments have more incentives than autocracies to signal responsiveness to these
concerns, as reputation costs in democracies can translate into electoral losses. Thus,
we expect that governments in democracies should be more likely to sign, especially in
cases where landmines are militarily less beneficial. Similarly, prevailing international
norms in regards to human rights are likely to impact states’ signing decision. To
capture international reputation costs we include the cumulative number of countries
having signed the Ottowa convention in a particular year, assuming that the number
of signatories is indicative of the international diffusion and strength of this particular
norm (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).19
Implication 2 suggests that the likelihood of G signing a treaty decreases as the
probability of facing a mean NSA increases. In this case, only if military costs for an
NSA of relinquishing landmines are small will governments later sign-on, after NSAs
have done so. This allows us to propose the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. Governments are less likely to sign a constraining treaty if faced by
armed non-state actors that are unlikely to comply with a convention.
Hypothesis 4. If the government believes itself to be facing an armed non-state actor
that is unlikely to comply with a convention, the government is more likely to sign if
18Simmons (2009), makes a similar assumption in her theory on human rights treaty compliance (see
also Conrad and Ritter, 2013).
19We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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the NSA’s value of using landmines is small.
Hypothesis 5. NSAs are more likely to sign a convention if the costs of compliance
with a convention are small.
We assume the expected cost of non-compliance to be private information. How-
ever, actors form their prior beliefs over the antagonist’s costs of non-compliance with
a convention by observing the use of one-sided violence against civilians. Thus, where
a prior history of one-sided violence gives the government reason to believe that the
armed non-state actor is “mean” or relatively unconcerned about potential costs of non-
compliance, the act of signing by an NSA can convey a credible signal that induces
the government to sign as well. By contrast, if the government believes that the armed
non-state actor is “nice” as it has not targeted civilians, then it will move to ratify first.
For these three hypotheses we also consider the military benefit of landmines
relative to the cost of treaty adherence. If landmines are of reasonable military and
tactical value to an armed NSA, late signing by an NSA will be followed by the
government signing the convention too. We argue that anti-personnel mines are of
greatest military use when they can be used to defend controlled territory, and that
larger NSAs will be less dependent on this type of weapon.
Implication 1 also allows us to relate the prior belief p of a “mean” G with the
actions of the NSA. More specifically, the latter are much more likely to sign if this
prior belief is high, allowing us to state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6. NSAs are more likely to sign a convention if they believe that the
government will not comply after signing.
The hypotheses stated so far focus on the signing decisions of the two actors.
Implication 1, together with our basic assumption on compliance decisions, allow us
to formulate the following additional hypotheses on compliance by the two actors:
Hypothesis 7. Governments with high reputation gains and low costs from relinquish-
ing the use of landmines are more likely to comply with a constraining treaty.
Hypothesis 8. Armed non-state actors are more likely to comply if the military value
of landmines is small.
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Empirical analysis
Testing our model requires dyadic data, as we analyze the strategic interaction between
armed non-state actors and governments. We focus on the regions and time periods
where Geneva Call has been active, and include the following countries and years:20
• Africa (2000 onwards): Burundi, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Western Sa-
hara/Morocco.
• Asia (2000 onwards): Burma-Myanmar, India, Philippines, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia.
• Caucasus (2006 onwards): Azerbaijan [and Armenia],21 Georgia.
• Europe (2001 onwards): Turkey.
• Latin America (2003 onwards): Colombia.
• Middle East (2000 onwards): Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,22 Yemen.
The relevant dyads clearly include all governments in countries where Geneva Call
has been engaged. However, selecting NSAs is less straightforward. Geneva Call
approaches predominantly NSAs that have used landmines in the past.23 As there is
likely to be some error in this assessment, we assume that, in principle, any armed
non-state organization is a potential signatory of Geneva Call’s deed of commitment.
To ensure systematic selection criteria, we only include armed non-state organizations
that (1) have been engaged in armed conflict according to the UCDP criteria for at least
one year during the period 1989 through 2009 (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen,
2008),24 (2) are politically active, and (3) maintain an armed wing.
20Geneva Call only provides accurate start and end dates of engagement for a subset of countries,
and we use the start year of engagement in regions for all others. See appendix for a full list of NSA-
government dyads.
21UCDP does not consider Armenia a primary conflict party since it does not face an internal
challenge but only supports the separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan.
22In Lebanon, Geneva Call is mainly in contact with organizations affiliated with Hezbollah, and we
also include the Israel-Hezbollah dyad.
23Personal communication by Pascal Bongard (program officer Geneva Call, January 5, 2011). We
also obtained a list of NSAs contacted by Geneva Call and use this subset of cases in a set of robustness
checks of our main findings in the appendix. The NSA selection strategy is likely to bias our results
against finding any effects of the proposed convention.
24UCDP defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government
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Table 3: Dyad-Years
NSA active & armed
Conflict active Yes Unclear Total
No 215 212 427
Yes 239 0 239
Total 454 212 666
Non-state organizations that meet these criteria enter the dataset once they have
been actively involved in an intrastate armed conflict, and following Geneva Call’s
engagement in the region. They are not considered prior to their active involvement
in armed conflict, but once active, remain in the dataset up until 2009, when the
coverage of our dataset ends, and regardless of whether the respective conflict has
reached the 25-fatality threshold every year since.25 However, consistent with the
above-mentioned criteria, we only include NSAs as long as they qualify as politically
active organizations that maintain their own armed wing (our coding effort). Table 3
summarizes the dyad-years in our dataset. We rely on both a strict coding (dyad-years
in the first column) as well as a more lenient coding that also includes dyad-years with
unclear activity in terms of either or both of these two criteria (second column).26 We
report the results based on the lenient coding below, but provide the ones based on the
“strict” sample in the appendix.
We consider two outcome variables. The first indicates whether the NSA in a
given dyad-year has signed Geneva Call’s deed of commitment banning anti-personnel
mines, or whether the government has ratified the international mine-ban treaty. The
second pertains to actual compliance, based on information from the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database.27 The variables Mine
useG and Mine useA indicate whether the state (G) or non-state actor (A) used land-
mines and/or improvised explosive devices in given year. Lacking a better measure, we
of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (http://www.pcr.uu.
se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/). Some com-
mitment signatories — usually small organizations and splinter groups — are not included in the UCDP
data (see data appendix).
25To illustrate, the Mouvement des forces de´mocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) vs. Senegal dyad is
first coded as active in 1990 in the UCDP dyadic dataset (v. 1-2010) and remained active in 2000. We
include this dyad for all years after Geneva Call becomes active in the region (2000+), although the 25
battle-related threshold is not reached for every year after 2000.
26As can be easily seen, dyad-years that reach the 25 battle-related deaths threshold that defines
conflict activity (according to UCDP) are always coded as active and armed opposition organizations.
27http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/report/dsp_MainForm.asp.
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use an indicator for all types of mines and other ‘improvised explosive devices.’ This
includes victim-activated devices as well as remote-controlled devices that detonate on
demand,28 but we consider it the best mine use measure currently available.29
We now detail our measures of the key elements in the theoretical model. We
use a dummy variable Territorial control denoting whether the NSA exerts at least a
moderate level of control over its main territory, adopted from Cunningham, Gleditsch
and Salehyan (2009). We have argued above that this is related to the costs of treaty
adherence (wA). Since landmines are an effective way of securing territory, relin-
quishing their use will make the NSA more vulnerable. Use of mines by government
indicates whether landmines and improvised explosive devices were used by states in
a dyad after 1997 and prior to Geneva Call’s engagement in the respective region.30 To
capture size-related effects, such as military capacity, we use an estimate of the Troop
size of the NSA, adopted from Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009).
One-sided violence (OSV) captures the extent of deliberate and direct violence
against civilians attributed to the NSA and the government by the UCDP.31 More
specifically, we use the best estimate of fatalities for all incidents of one-sided violence
for a given actor and year.32 We employ OSV as a proxy for the prior beliefs p and q,
assuming that civilian targeting indicates lower costs for being caught in violation of a
treaty (i.e., smaller ci terms).
Democracy is measured using the binary Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)
indicator, which we use as a proxy for the sensitivity of governments to domestic
reputation costs. We are primarily interested in the difference between systems where
28Written communication by Hanna Ucko Neill, IISS Armed Conflict Database coordinator, Decem-
ber 14, 2010.
29Geneva Call also assesses compliance and deploys monitoring missions. So far these have,
however, not been carried out in a systematic and recurrent fashion (personal communication by
Pascal Bongard, program officer Geneva Call, January 5, 2011). We do not use the “Landmine
and Cluster Munition Monitor” elaborated by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (see
http://www.the-monitor.org/ as it appears less systematic than the IISS source.
30Source: IISS Armed Conflict Database, http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/
report/dsp_MainForm.asp (accessed February 11, 2011).
31The UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset (Eck and Hultman, 2007) records deadly attacks on
civilians by governments and armed groups resulting in at least 25 deaths per calendar year.
32Where actors are involved in more than one conflict dyad, or where the reported figures do not
distinguish between distinct organizations, we assign the same value to all relevant dyads. For example,
the government of Burundi was involved in several conflicts during the period 1989-2009, and “Hutu
rebels” encompasses more than one NSA in conflict (Harbom and Sundberg, 2009). In such cases, we
assign the OSV fatality estimates to several dyads. Israel is an exception to this rule, as Geneva Call
only covers the conflict with Hezbollah. Fatalities caused by militias publicly alleged to have acted on
behalf of the state (Autodefensas Unidas in Colombia, Janjaweed in Sudan) are assigned to the state.
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governments are chosen through contested elections and systems where this is not
the case rather than the degree of democracy. As the original data end in 2008,
we extrapolate for 2009. As a proxy for international reputation costs we use the
cumulative number of countries having signed and ratified the Ottowa convention.33
Finally, we control for whether the conflict is active or not in a given year according
to the UCDP 25 battle-related deaths criterion.
Ratifying Mine-Ban Treaties
We first examine the empirical implications of our model for the ratification of the
mine-ban treaty, resp. convention, by the governments and NSAs. Table 4 reports
the ratification sequence of both governments and NSAs in terms of the number of
countries and dyads, as well as the relative percentage of countries and dyads in
parentheses (dropping observations following signing). The first sub-table shows the
initial decisions in line with the model where the government goes first. The upper left
cell in the upper sub-table shows that we have 6 countries (and 54 dyads) where no
NSA signs after the government does, and 2 countries and 2 dyads where they do. The
lower right cell indicates that we have 8 countries (and 11 dyads) where NSAs sign
when the government has not, a much higher relative share. This suggests that NSAs
are more likely to sign the Geneva Call convention if the government has not signed
the Ottowa convention. The lower part of the table indicates whether governments
“follow suit,” after observing the behavior of NSA. This shows that once NSAs have
signed the Geneva Call convention, governments are much more likely to follow suit
than in the reverse scenario (i.e., when governments sign first).
We proceed to a series of logit models to evaluate the theory’s implications for the
signing decisions of the parties. The strategic nature of these decisions creates statis-
tical estimation problems. While there has been considerable work on estimators for
complete information models (see, e.g., Signorino, 1999), only few models have been
proposed for incomplete information models like ours (see, e.g., Lewis and Schultz,
2003). Moreover, these solutions tend to be demanding in terms of the underlying
data. Therefore, as a more feasible alternative, we estimate separate models for each
relevant decision node in figure 1. We employ Gelman and Hill’s (2006) Bayesian
logit model to address problems of complete separation, given the small number of
33Source: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)
/6E65F97C9D695724C12571C0003D09EF?OpenDocument, accessed August 14, 2015).
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Table 4: Signatories and “Follow-Suit” Signatories
NSA has not signed
Government has signed Government has not signed
NSA does not sign 6, 54 (75.0, 96.4) 13, 115 (61.9, 93.2)
NSA signs 2, 2 (25.0, 3.6) 8, 11 (38.1, 6.8)
Total 8, 56 (100.0, 100.0) 21, 126 (100.0, 100.0)
Note: cell entries report number of countries, number of dyads (% of countries, % of dyads)
Government has not signed
NSA has signed NSA has not signed
Government does not sign 34 (91.2) 146 (96.6)
Government signs 3 (8.8) 5 (3.4)
Total 37 (100.0) 146 (100.0)
Note: cell entries report number of number of countries (% of countries)
cases.34
Table 5: Bayesian Logit Estimates of Signing
Government NSA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
gov. signs gov. signs before NSA gov. signs after NSA NSA signs NSA signs before gov.
democracy (lagged) −0.588 −0.406 −1.013 0.313 −0.517
(0.674) (0.716) (2.277) (1.072) (1.287)
no. of ratifying countries 0.003 0.001 0.013 −0.40 −0.038
(0.023) (0.023) (0.118) (0.032) (0.041)
use of mines by government −1.113∗ −1.364∗ −0.000 (0.754) 0.941
(0.677) (0.741) (2.500) (0.983) (1.316)
one-sided violenceA (logged) 0.005 0.011 −0.061
(0.024) (0.025) (0.084)
one-sided violenceG (logged) 0.010 0.029
(0.039) (0.045)
territorial control ≥ moderate −0.331 −0.421 1.013 −1.595 −0.824
(0.638) (0.661) (2.277) (1.076) (1.284)
NSA troop size (logged) 0.507∗ 0.391 0.365 0.929∗ 0.732
(0.278) (0.287) (0.821) (0.413) (0.457)
active conflict 2.777∗ 2.611∗ 1.013 0.106 −0.678
(1.353) (1.379) (2.277) (1.114) (1.264)
constant −8.855∗ −7.386 −8.624 −6.552 −4.448
(4.948) (5.010) (19.633) (6.064) (7.716)
N 217 209 8 318 209
logL −14.684 −12.395 23.047 3.441 11.415
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.1
Models 1-3 in Table 5 focus on the government’s decision to sign the Ottawa
convention. Model 1 looks at whether the government signs without taking into ac-
count the stage in the game tree. Hypothesis 1 states that higher reputation costs
(democracy, as well as ratification behavior of other governments) and higher costs of
relinquishing land mines (use) should increase, respectively decrease, the likelihood of
signing the treaty. We only find partial support for this expectation. Use of land mines
34We offer a series of robustness checks in the appendix, including replications with standard errors
clustered by country and controls for time dependence. These do not affect our substantive results.
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significantly decreases the likelihood of signing, but democratic governments are not
more likely to sign. In addition, the coefficient for the variable capturing international
reputation costs (number of countries having ratified), while positive as expected, also
fails to reach statistical significance. Similarly, while hypothesis 3 states that one-
sided violence committed by an NSA should make governments less likely to sign
the Ottawa treaty, we find a positive, although statistically insignificant, effect. We
also find mixed results for hypothesis 4 as both the NSA’s territorial control and troop
size have the expected negative/positive effect, but only the latter coefficient reaches
statistical significance. Finally, during times of active conflicts, governments appear
significantly more likely to sign the Ottowa convention.
We then relax the assumption that governments sign independently of what the
NSA is doing and focus on the government’s decision in two distinct situations, namely
when the NSA has not yet signed (model 2), and signing after the NSA has signed
(model 3 — given the small number of cases, these results have to be interpreted with
caution). The results suggest that these situations differ. Model 2 shows that signing
costs (previous use of mines) have a statistically significant effect on the government’s
decision to sign before an NSA has done so, but much less so when an NSA has
already signed. This is in line with the implications from our theoretical model in that
high signing costs should reduce the likelihood of a government signing the Ottowa
convention. Our proxies for reputation costs (democracy and number of ratifiers)
remain insignificant, although the negative coefficient for democracy is larger after
the NSA has signed. In addition, it appears that the reputation costs arising at the
international level operate in the expected direction when an NSA has already signed,
though the coefficient is associated with considerable uncertainty.35 These results
contradict our first hypothesis. When the NSA has not yet signed the convention,
the pressure on governments to sign the Ottawa treaty seems especially high in active
conflicts.
Contrary to our hypothesis 3, we also find that one-sided violence by the NSA, if
anything, increases the likelihood of a government signing the treaty before an NSA.
Our theoretical model implies that the government’s prior belief of facing a “mean”
type, proxied by one-sided violence by the NSA, should decrease the likelihood of
35In these models we encounter a problem of complete separation. Non-democratic countries never
sign in this instance (but there are very few cases, and certain values of one-sided violence by the NSA
also perfectly predict the outcome). This is addressed by using a Bayesian logit model, which also
permits the estimation with the small number of cases in model 3.
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signing at the first decision node. We find a slightly negative effect, however, only if
an NSA has already signed.
Finally regarding our hypothesis 4 we find that the NSA’s troop size increases the
likelihood of a government signing, as we would expect based on our model. Both
coefficients, however, fail to reach statistical significance. The same is true for the
effect of the NSA’s control of territory, for which we only find the expected sign if the
government makes a decision to sign before an NSA.
Models 4-5 in Table 5 provide results for the NSAs.36 Here, too, the implications
for NSA’s actions involve the prior beliefs and the costs faced by the government
and the NSA. Model 4 simply considers whether NSAs sign Geneva Call’s deed of
commitment. The results provide strong evidence that the costs of relinquishing land-
mines (troop size, and to a lesser degree territorial control) clearly affect an NSA’s
decision to sign, which offers support for our fifth hypothesis. Larger NSAs are more
likely to sign, while moderate territorial control decreases the likelihood of signing,
which is in line with our hypothesis. Again, however, contrary to hypothesis 3, one-
sided violence as a proxy for prior beliefs does not seem to affect the NSA’s decision,
although the coefficient has the expected positive sign. Finally, we find partial support
for our second hypothesis, as higher reputation costs for the government (democracy)
increase—though statistically not significantly—the likelihood of the NSA signing
Geneva Call’s convention. The same does, however, not hold for reputation costs
linked to the number of ratifiers. Moreover, the costs of relinquishing landmines
(proxied by the government’s use) does not decrease the probability of an NSA to
sign the convention as expected.
Examining the NSA’s decision when the government has not yet signed, we find
largely similar results, except that the coefficient for democracy becomes negative and
the coefficient for an NSA’s troop size becomes statistically insignificant.37 Finally, an
NSA’s decisions appear not to be affected by whether a conflict is active or not.
36There are hardly any cases of NSAs signing after a government. A model for this decision mode
generated estimation problems, and we omit it from table 5.
37These disappointing results might be linked to the last configuration under which proposition 1
envisions an equilibrium. More precisely, governments are more likely to sign after the NSAs, but it
is mostly “mean” NSAs that will sign first. As this configuration is based on knife-edge conditions we
refrained from using it as basis for a hypothesis.
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How Effective are the Conventions?
We now turn to evaluating the effect of conventions in terms of landmine use by
governments and NSAs. Models 1 and 3 in Table 6 report how signing either the
Ottawa convention or Geneva Call’s deed of commitment affects the respective actors’
behavior, disregarding that signatory status is potentially endogenous to its effect.38
For the government’s decision to comply we find that its signatory status significantly
reduces the likelihood of landmines use, while that of the NSA has no effect on
compliance. Prior use of landmines and an active conflict reduce notably the likelihood
of compliance, as does surprisingly also democracy, but not the number of ratifiers.
Model 3 in table 6 shows that NSAs that sign do not behave differently from non-
signatories in mine use. Interestingly, the signatory status of the government has the
reverse effect. The NSA is much more likely to use landmines if the government has
signed the Ottawa convention. NSAs with at least moderate territorial control appear
to use landmines less frequently, while larger NSAs do so more frequently.
These simple probit results disregard the strategic dependence of the signing de-
cisions by governments and NSAs implied by our theoretical model. We address this
important issue in models 2 and 4 of tables 6 by estimating trivariate probit models to
consider explicitly the endogenous nature of the government’s and the NSA’s signatory
status, using the previous model specification.39
Taking into account the possibly endogenous nature of the signing of a convention
or a deed of commitment affects both our estimates for the signing and the compliance
38For all analyses in this section we report a full set of robustness checks in the appendix with more
restricted samples, excluding all cases from Somalia and restricted to NSAs engaged by Geneva Call.
Since we have more than one NSA in some countries we also bootstrap our standard errors stratified
by NSA. These robustness checks overwhelmingly confirm our main findings, with deviations arising
occasionally when sample sizes become increasingly small for more restrictive definitions.
39Our empirical application does not suffer from partial observability, and models designed for
this issue are not appropriate (e.g., Heckman-type models). The trivariate probit model allows for
correlations among the error terms of three equations, corresponding to the two signing decisions and
the compliance decision. As Wilde (2000) has shown for the bivariate probit, such a model also allows
for endogenous regressors, in our case the two signing decisions. Estimating simultaneously three
interdependent equations for compliance and the signatory statuses of governments and non-state actors
allows us to acknowledge and assess the extent of the endogeneity in terms of the magnitude and
direction of the correlations between the error terms. Ideally, our signing equations should contain
two components: the initial signing decision of the actors and the decision to remain part of the
Ottowa/Geneva Call’s convention regime. Since no single government nor NSA has left these regimes,
the respective coefficients are, however, unidentified. Hence, the estimates for the signing decision
conflate the effects of both the signing decision and maintaining one’s status under the two conventions.
We control, however, for the lagged signatory status in the signing equations.
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Table 6: Results for Compliance/Mine Use
Government NSA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
probit trivariate probit probit trivariate probit
DV: G use G use G sig. A sig. A use A use G sig. A sig.
government signed −0.647∗∗∗−0.547 0.507∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗
Ottawa convention (0.230) (0.440) (0.138) (0.343)
NSA signed Geneva Call’s 0.283 −0.185 0.042 −1.015∗∗
deed of commitment (0.327) (0.436) (0.305) (0.466)
government signed 1.633∗∗∗ 1.696∗∗∗
Ottawa conv. (lagged) (0.364) (0.394)
NSA signed Geneva Call’s 1.914∗∗∗ 1.771∗∗∗
deed of cmtnt. (lagged) (0.340) (0.411)
democracy (lagged) 0.755∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.183 0.864∗ 0.144 0.316
(0.213) (0.213) (0.174) (0.494) (0.226) (0.445)
no. ratifying countries −0.038∗∗∗−0.039∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗−0.007 0.030∗∗∗−0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013)
use of mines by government 2.516∗∗∗ 2.574∗∗∗−1.011∗∗∗ 1.442∗∗∗ −1.185∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.294) (0.178) (0.364) (0.195) (0.374)
territorial control ≥ moderate 0.356∗ −1.243∗∗∗ −0.319∗ −0.413∗∗ 0.170 −1.090∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.372) (0.185) (0.180) (0.206) (0.376)
NSA troop size (logged) 0.112 0.956∗∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.135∗ 0.065 0.239∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.224) (0.081) (0.088) (0.093) (0.203)
one-sided violenceG (logged) 0.017 0.020
(0.014) (0.012)
one-sided violenceA (logged) −0.010 −0.112
(0.008) (0.009)
active conflict 0.300 0.284 0.164 −1.000∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗−1.125∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.231) (0.201) (0.376) (0.13) (0.196) (0.240) (0.341)
Constant 3.500∗∗ 3.499∗∗ −5.570∗∗∗−9.426∗∗∗ −1.399∗∗ −1.799∗∗∗−6.407∗∗∗−6.696∗∗
(1.445) (1.479) (1.535) (2.911) (0.636) (0.661) (1.679) (2.633)
atan(ρ12) −0.011 −0.185
(0.222) (0.234)
atan(ρ13) 0.423 1.008∗
(0.263) (0.540)
atan(ρ23) −0.528∗∗ −0.435∗
(0.235) (0.250)
N 310 310 266 266
logL −97.480 -304.0 −166.212 -339.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
equation.40 For the government’s decision to sign we still find the strong negative
effect of previous mine-use on signing the Ottawa convention (in support of our first
hypothesis), while for the variables reflecting reputation costs we obtain positive coef-
ficients, of which only the one for the number of ratifiers is significant. We still find no
effect of prior beliefs (one-sided violence, hypothesis 3). The NSA’s decision is now,
as expected, affected both by territorial control, troop strength, one-sided violence by
the government (though statistically insignificant) and democracy. More specifically,
NSAs with at least moderate control over territory are much less likely to sign Geneva
40The difference is due to the considerable correlation in the error terms of the two signing equations.
Apparently, omitted variables affect similarly the decisions of both governments and NSAs to sign or
refrain from doing so. However, in the trivariate probit model we only implicitly take into account the
sequence of signing decisions.
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Call’s deed of commitment. Larger NSAs, however, are much more likely to submit to
this regime, while NSAs in democracies and those faced by “mean” governments, are
more likely to sign.
Taking these endogenous signing decisions into account we find divergent effects
of the treaty, resp. convention, on the use of mines. State actors not using mines
are disproportionately likely to join the Ottawa convention, and failing to take this
into account can be problematic in assessing the effects of the convention. Taking
this into account suggests that the treaty by itself has no notable effect on the use
of mines by governments (the insignificant, though negative coefficient also supports
the pessimistic assessment, e.g., by Drezner, 2005). Surprisingly, we also find that
democracy, and thus domestic reputation costs, increase the likelihood of a government
using landmines. While this contradicts our hypothesis 7, the positive and significant
coefficient for prior use of mines by the government as well as the negative and
significant coefficient for the number of ratifiers lend support to this same hypothe-
sis. We also find that NSAs signing the deed of commitment decreases (though not
significantly) the probability of landmines being used by governments.
The compliance model for the NSAs also suggests that taking signing decisions
into account is necessary. When doing so, we find that the government’s signing of the
Ottowa convention increases the likelihood that NSAs use landmines, while the deed
of commitment by Geneva Call reduces it significantly. This latter finding points to
the effectiveness of the deed of commitment, a result that only appears once selection
issues are taken into account. In support of our hypothesis 8, the estimated coefficients
for NSA characteristics, namely whether it is large and enjoys at least moderate levels
of territorial control, remain statistically significant with the expected signs.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have proposed a simple game-theoretical model of the decisions of NSAs and
state parties on whether to commit to a specific international humanitarian norm.
In line with the theoretical model, our empirical analysis provides evidence that the
decisions by governments and NSAs to sign a ban of anti-personnel mines are clearly
interdependent. Governments’ decisions to sign appear to be notably affected by
whether NSAs have already signed. For NSAs, as expected, territorial control is
an important factor influencing the costs of implementation and thus also the their
24
decisions to sign.
Our results are also instructive regarding the consequences of signing such con-
ventions. When neglecting the endogenous nature of the decision to sign, we find that
the Ottowa convention significantly reduces governments’ use of landmines. However,
this effect disappears when we take the singing decision into account. Accounting for
the endogenous nature of actors’ signing decision is equally important for assessing
the effectiveness of the deed of commitment for NSAs, where our findings point in
the opposite direction: Based on a naive analysis that neglects NSAs decision to sign,
we fail to find a significant effect. When incorporating the signing decisions of both
the treaty and the deed of commitment, however, we find a strong effect on NSA
compliance. Thus, Geneva Call’s deed of commitment seems to increase the likelihood
that NSAs will remove landmines from their arsenal. Possible explanations for this
contrasting finding include that signing a convention is a rare opportunity to gain
formal (international) recognition for NSAs, or that NSAs are particularly vulnerable
to monitoring.
While our finding regarding NSA compliance is very encouraging, other ways to
achieve these goals are also possible. For example, whereas Geneva Call unsuccess-
fully tried to engage the FARC in its initiative, as outlined in the introduction, this NSA
has nevertheless started to remove landmines in 2015 – even without a signed deed
of commitment, and thanks to the ongoing peace process.41 Future research should
not only consider the logic of strategic interaction between governments and NSAs,
but also examine the actors’ internal dynamics and decision processes that motivate
compliance with international humanitarian norms, as well as the sources of NSAs
capacity to enforce compliance within their ranks.
To be sure, not all our theoretical expectations found empirical support. For in-
stance, the expected compliance by NSAs does not appear to influence a government’s
decision to sign first. Moreover, we argued that governments’ vulnerability to repu-
tation costs, both domestic and international ones, plays a considerable role in their
decisions to sign. While we found some evidence for the effect of international reputa-
tion concerns, our proxy for the vulnerability to domestic reputation costs, democracy,
did not turn out to play the significant role that we expected. This result resonates with
the contradicting findings on the effects of democracy in previous studies on human
rights treaties and their effects.
41See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-32941200.
25
In summary, our results show that the actions of governments and NSAs in the
realm of humanitarian law should be considered interdependent not only when it comes
to the behavior of these actors in conflict, but also regarding their decisions to subject
themselves to humanitarian law. These results speak to the broader literature on hu-
man rights conventions and the effectiveness of these treaties. Most importantly, our
analysis clearly suggests that assessing the effectiveness of humanitarian conventions
needs to take into consideration the selection effects linked to the conscious decisions
of actors committing to these initiatives. The results also suggest that NSAs influence
the costs and decision making of governments. In the empirical realm that we covered,
where an NGO actively intervenes to influence NSAs, this is to be expected. We
surmise that it is very likely, however, that NSAs and NGOs influence these costs also
in other circumstances through more subtle and indirect means.
Appendix
In this appendix we provide proofs of the propositions presented in the main text.
Proofs
We first present a few observations helpful in proving the main propositions presented
in the main text. We then prove the two propositions characterizing equilibrium be-
havior under complete and imperfect and incomplete and imperfect information.42
1. Observation
If G signs at its first decision node, A will never sign, since it obtains the benefit
of compliance by G for free, or cannot improve on its own its situation if G
should sign but not comply.
Proof: Simply comparing expected utilities with p′ the possibly updated prior
belief yields:
42For simplicity’s sake we consider situations where actors are indifferent between two actions only
when assessing whether semi-pooling equilibria may exist.
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EUA(sign) = p
′ × (−cwA − q × wA + wG − (1− q)× cA)
= +(1− p′)× (−cwA − q × wA + (1− q)× cA)
= −cwA − q × wA − (1− q)cA + p′ × wG (1)
EUA(not sign) = p
′ × (−cwA + wG) + (1− p′)× (−cwA)
= −cwA + p′ × wG (2)
As wA and cA are both positive, independent of q A will never sign. QED.
2. Observation
If A signs the agreement (when G has not in the first round), G’s decision to sign
after A is independent of its possibly updated belief of A’s type q′.
Proof: To see this assume first that G is “nice” (i.e., p = 1)
EUG(sign) = q
′ × (−cwG − wG + wA) + (1− q′)× (−cwG − wG)
= −cwG − wG + q′ × wA (3)
EUG(not sign) = q
′ × (−cwG − 2× rG + wA) + (1− q′)× (−cwG − 2× rG)
= −cwG − 2× rG + q′ × wA (4)
Consequently, G signs if −cwG − wG + q′ × wA > −cwG − 2× rG + q′ × wA,
hence only if 2× rG > wG.
If G is “mean” (i.e., p = 0)
EUG(sign) = q
′ × (−cwG + wA − cG) + (1− q′)× (−cwG − cG)
= −cwG − cG + q′ × wA (5)
EUG(not sign) = q
′ × (−cwG − 2× rG + wA) + (1− q′)× (−cwG − 2× rG)
= −cwG − 2× rG + q′ × wA (6)
In that case G will sign if −cG > −2× rG or 2× rG > cG.
In both cases, i.e. independent of p, the decision of G to sign or not is indepen-
dent of q′. QED.
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3. Observation
From observation 2 follows that if 2× rG > wG then independent of its type G
will always sign at its second decision node.43 If, however, wG > 2 × rG then
the “nice” type does not sign, but the “mean” type signs as long as 2× rG > cG,
but will not comply or does not sign if cG > 2 × rG. As in this case the payoff
for A is identical, it can anticipate its payoff, namely if 2× rG > wG and q = 1
EUA(sign) = p
′ × (−cwA + wG − wA) + (1− p′)× (−cwA − wA)
= −cwA − wA + p′ × wG (7)
EUA(not sign) = −cwA (8)
Consequently a “nice” A signs in that case if p′ > wA
wG
. For a “mean” A the
payoffs are as follows:
EUA(sign) = p
′ × (−cwA + wG − cA) + (1− p′)× (−cwA − cA)
= −cwA − cA + p× wG (9)
EUA(not sign) = −cwA (10)
Consequently a “mean” A signs in that case if p′ > cA
wG
If on the other hand wG > 2 × rG then A knows that G either will not sign or
will not comply. Consequently, its payoffs for a “nice” (q = 0) type are
EUA(sign) = −cwA − wA (11)
EUA(not sign) = −cwA (12)
As wA > 0 A will never sign. For a “mean” type
EUA(sign) = −cwA − cA (13)
EUA(not sign) = −cwA (14)
As cA > 0 A will never sign.
43This follows from the fact that p = 0 implies wG > cG.
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Complete and imperfect information
Proposition 2 (Complete and imperfect information). In any subgame-perfect equi-
librium, either G fails to sign at its first decision node but signs after A’s signing (if
p = 1, q = 1 and 2× rG > wG), or G signs at its first decision node, while A refrains
from doing so (in all other cases).
Proof of Proposition 2 44
Based on the observations above the following subgame-perfect equilibrium can
be established:45
1. If p = 1, q = 1 andwG > 2×rG, wG > wA, rG > wA G : {sign, sign, comply},
R : {not sign, sign, comply}46
2. If p = 1, q = 1 andwG > 2×rG, wG > wA, wA > rG G : {not sign, sign, comply},
R : {not sign, sign, comply}
3. If p = 1, q = 1 and wG > 2 × rG, wG < wA G : {not sign, signcomply},
R : {not sign, not sign, .}
4. If p = 1, q = 1 and 2 × rG > wG, rG > wG G : {sign, not sign, comply},
R : {not sign, not sign, .}
5. If p = 1, q = 1 and 2× rG > wG, wG > rG G : {not sign, not sign, comply},
R : {not sign, not sign, .}
6. If p = 0, q = 1 and 2 × rG > cG, rG > cG G : {sign, sign, not comply},
R : {not sign, not sign, comply}
7. If p = 0, q = 1 and 2 × rG > cG, cG > rG G : {not sign, sign, not comply},
R : {not sign, not sign, comply}
8. If p = 0, q = 1 and cG > 2 × rG, rG > cG G : {sign, not sign, not comply},
R : {not sign, not sign, comply}
44We refrain from presenting the equilibria of the complete and perfect information game as these are
closely related to the ones presented here.
45For simplicity we omit cases where either of the two actors is indifferent between his or her two
actions.
46For simplicity we shorten the strategies for both actors by only stating their actions at their first two
decision nodes and indicate with the third element the action taken at their remaining decision nodes, as
these do not vary.
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9. If p = 0, q = 1 and cG > 2×rG, cG > rG G : {not sign, not sign, not comply},
R : {not sign, not sign, comply}
10. If p = 1, q = 0 and wG > 2 × rG G : {not sign, not sign, comply}, R :
{not sign, not sign, not comply}
11. If p = 1, q = 0 and 2×rG > wG, cA > wG, rG > wG G : {sign, sign, comply},
R : {not sign, not sign, notcomply}
12. If p = 1, q = 0 and 2×rG > wG, cA > wG, wG > rG G : {not sign, sign, comply},
R : {not sign, not sign, notcomply}
13. If p = 1, q = 0 and 2×rG > wG, wG > cA, rG > wG G : {sign, sign, comply},
R : {not sign, sign, notcomply}
14. If p = 1, q = 0 and 2×rG > wG, wG > cA, wG > rG G : {not sign, sign, comply},
R : {not sign, sign, notcomply}
15. If p = 0, q = 0 and rG > cG G : {sign, sign, not comply},R : {not sign, not sign, .}
16. If p = 0, q = 0 and 2 × rG > cG, cG > rG G : {not sign, sign, not comply.},
R : {not sign, not sign, not comply}
17. If p = 0, q = 0 and cG > 2 × rG G : {not sign, not sign, not comply.},
R : {not sign, not sign, not comply}
As these equilibria exhaust all possible conditions, proposition 2 simply summa-
rizes the insights from these equilibrium characterizations. QED.
Incomplete information
As mentioned in the main text we simplify the model for the incomplete informa-
tion version by letting ci ∈ {2 × wi, wi2 }. ci takes the higher value if i is a “nice”
type, and the lower one when i is a “mean” type. We solve the game by backward
induction as, we will show below, either no private information is transmitted, or G’s
action reveal all information. We recall also, that whether G and A comply with their
treaty/convention obligation is solely determined by their type.47 Finally, we do not
47We note that a semi-pooling equilibrium exists in mixed strategies in which the mean G
probabilistically signs the treaty, while the nice one does not, while the nice A after G’s decision not
sign will also refrain from signing, but the mean A signs probabilistically.
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consider situations where G or A is indifferent between several courses of actions
and thus also only consider pure strategy equilibria. Consequently, we will start by
analyzing A’s last left-most decision node before compliance decisions are reached. A
compares the following expected utilities (with p′ indicating the possibly updated prior
belief):
EUA(sign|q = 1) = p′(−cwA − wA + wG) + (1− p′)(−cwA − wA)
EUA(sign|q = 0) = p′(−cwA − cA + wG) + (1− p′)(−cwA − cA)
EUA(¬sign|q = .) = p′(−cwA + wG) + (1− p′)(−cwA)
For both types of A it follows that they will never sign after G’s decision at the first
decision-node to sign the treaty.
Moving to G’s right-most last decision-node before the compliance decisions, G
will consider the following expected utilities:
EUG(sign|p = 1) = q′(−cwG − wG + wA) + (1− q′)(−cwG − wG)
EUG(sign|p = 0) = q′(−cwG − cG + wA) + (1− q′)(−cwG − cG)
EUG(¬sign|p = .) = q′(−cwG − 2rG + wA) + (1− q′)(−cwG − 2rG)
Consequently, the nice G will sign after As decision to sign if q′wA− cwG−wG >
q′wA − cwG − 2rG from which it follows that 2rG > wG has to hold. For the mean G
to sign q′wA − cwG − cG > q′wA − cwG − 2rG has to hold, implying that 4rG > wG
(as cG = wG2 for the mean type). From this it follows that three situations have to be
distinguished: if wG > 4rG no G will ever sign at its second decision node on the right
of the game, if 4rG > wG > 2rG then only the mean G will sign, while if 2rG > wG
then both Gs will sign.
Using this knowledge we consider A’s first decision node in the right part of the
game and assume first that wG > 4rG. Consequently, A’s expected utilities are the
following:
EUA(sign|q = .) = −cwA − wA
EUA(¬sign|q = .) = −cwA
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It follows trivially that neither type of A will ever sign. Consequently, G considers
at its first decision node the following expected utilites:
EUG(sign|p = 1) = −cwG − wG + rG
EUG(sign|p = 0) = −cwG − cG + rG
EUG(¬sign|p = .) = −cwG (15)
It follows directly that a nice G will sign if rG > wG while a mean G will sign as
long as 2rG > wG. So under the condition wG > 4rG three equilibria candidates exist,
namely that both Gs sign at the first decision node when rG > wG, which contradicts
our assumption wG > 4rG, that only the mean G signs at the first decision node if
wG > rG >
wG
2
, which again contradicts our assumption wG > 4rG, while if wG2 > rG
neither Gs nor As will ever sign. As this latter condition is not in contradiction with
our assumption wG > 4rG this establishes the first equilibrium of a pooling type.
Considering next the situation where 4rG > wG > 2rG, which implies that only a
mean G will sign after A’s signing, the following expected utilities for A are relevant
EUA(sign|q = 1) = p′(−cwA − wA) + (1− p′)(−cwA − wA)
EUA(sign|q = 0) = p′(−cwA − cA) + (1− p′)(−cwA − cA)
EUA(¬sign|q = .) = −cwA
From this it trivially follows that neither type of A will sign after Gs decision not to
sign. This implies that G considers at its first decision node the same expected utilities
as those in equation 15. But as above, the conditions for signing on rG and wG are
in contradiction with the assumption 4rG > wG > 2rG, implying that both Gs will
refrain from signing, establishing a second pooling equilibrium.
The last conditions to explore is when 2rG > wG, which implies that both types
of G will sign if A has done so before them. Consequently, A considers the following
expected utilities after G’s decision not to sign at its first decision node:
EUA(sign|q = 1) = p′(−cwA − wA + wG) + (1− p′)(−cwA − wA)
EUA(sign|q = 0) = p′(−cwA − cA + wG) + (1− p′)(−cwA − cA)
EUA(¬sign|q = .) = −cwA
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Consequently, a nice A will sign if p′wG − cwA − wA > −cwA implying that
p′ > wA
wG
, while for the mean A the condition implies p′ > wA
2wG
. As these lower bounds
for the updated belief p′ can not exceed 1 for both Gs to sign, it is easy to establish that
if wA > 2wG neither of A’s type will sign. This implies the same expected utilities
for G as in equations 15, and consequently the nice G will sign if rG > wG while the
mean G will sign if 2rG > wG. Consequently, if rG > wG holds in equilibrium both
Gs will sign, while A is not signing. If 2rG > wG > rG then the mean G will sign and
the nice G will not, and in both cases A will refrain from signing, which establishes an
additional pooling equilibria and a separating one. If 2wG > wA > wG and wA2wG > p
′
holds the same applies establishing another pooling equilibrium.
If 2wG > wA > wG and p′ > wA2wG then the mean A will sign after G’s refusal to
sign, while the nice A will not do so. Consequently G’s expected utility is as follows:
EUG(sign|p = 1) = −cwG − wG + rG
EUG(sign|p = 0) = −cwG − cG + rG
EUG(¬sign|p = 1) = q′(−cwG) + (1− q′)(−cwG − wG)
EUG(¬sign|p = 0) = q′(−cwG) + (1− q′)(−cwG − cG)
Consequently a nice G will sign at its first decision node if −cwG − wG + rG >
−cwG − wG + q′wG which implies that rGwG > q′. For the mean G −cwG − cG + rG >
−cwG − cG + q′cG has to hold for a decision to sign, which implies that 2rGwG > q′. As
we explore the case where 2rG > wG, this condition holds independent of the value
of q and q′. Consequently, rG > wG then both Gs will sign at the first decision node,
and A will not sign, establishing another pooling equilibrium. If 2rG > wG > rG and
rG
wG
> q′ then again both types of G sign at the first decision node and A refrains from
doing so. If 2rG > wG > rG and q′ > rGwG holds the mean G will sign, while the nice
one will refrain, implying that p′ = 0, which contradicts our initial assumptions so no
pooling equilibrium exists in this case.
Next, still under the assumption that 2rG > wG we consider the case where wG >
wA and p′ > wAwG leading both As to sign. In that case G’s expected utilities are as
follows:
33
EUG(sign|p = 1) = −cwG − wG + rG
EUG(sign|p = 0) = −cwG − cG + rG
EUG(¬sign|p = 1) = q(−cwG − wG + wA) + (1− q)(−cwG − wG)
EUG(¬sign|p = 0) = q(−cwG − cG + wA) + (1− q)(−cwG − cG)
Consequently, a nice G will sign if−cwG−wG+rG > qwA− cwG−wG implying
that rG
wA
> q′ and the same condition can also be derived for the meanG. Consequently,
rG
wA
> q holds then both Gs will sign and A will not sign, while if q > rG
wA
holds then
both Gs will not sign, but both As will sign, which induces both Gs also to sign, which
establishes another pooling equilibrium.
Next consider the case where 2rG > wG, wG > wA and wAwG > p
′ > wA
2wG
holds. As
in this cases only the mean A signs after G’s refusal to sign, the following expected
utilites are relevant for G:
EUG(sign|p = 1) = −cwG − wG + rG
EUG(sign|p = 0) = −cwG − cG + rG
EUG(¬sign|p = 1) = q(−cwG) + (1− q)(−cwG − wG)
EUG(¬sign|p = 0) = q(−cwG) + (1− q)(−cwG − cG)
Consequently the nice G will sign if −cwG − wG + rG > −cwG − wG + qwG
implying that rG
wG
> q. For the mean G the condition is −cwG − cG + rG > −cwG −
cG + qcG implying that 2rGwG > q
′. If rG > wG applies then trivially both conditions are
satisfied establishing a pooling equilibrium where both G will sign at the first decision
node, followed by A’s refusal to sign. If wG > rG and rGwG > q still holds then another
pooling equilibrium of the same type appears. If under 2rG > wG > rG and q > rGwG
then only the nice G will not sign, leading A to update its belief to p′ = 0 making
both types to refrain from signing. Consequently this establishes another separating
equilibrium.
Finally, the last case to consider is if wG > wA and wA2wG > p
′ holds. As in that
case no A will sign after G’s refusal to sign at the first decision node, the following
expected utilities for G become relevant:
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EUG(sign|p = 1) = −cwG − wG + rG
EUG(sign|p = 0) = −cwG − cG + rG
EUG(¬sign|p = .) = −cwG
It follows trivially that if rG > wG both Gs sign at the first decision node and A
refuses to do so. IfwG > rG > wG2 holds, we obtain a candidate separating equilibrium
in which the mean G signs at the first decision node while the nice one refrains from
doing so, which leads A to update its belief to p′ = 1. But this value exceeds the
upper limit of wA
2wG
> p′ so that this equilibrium cannot exist. Finally, if we consider
wG
2
> rG, this latter expression contradicts our assumption that 2rG > wG, so that no
equilibrium can exist under these conditions.
As this exhausts all possible configuration, this proves our proposition. QED.
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